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DUTIES TO ANIMALS: RAWLS' 
01 LEMMA 
In his .6. I~_eory' of )J:!stice John 
Rawls observes that his theory of 
"justice as fa; rness" is not a complete 
ethical theory because, among other 
reasons, it "would seem to include 
only our relations with other persons 
and to leave out of account how we 
are to conduct ourselves toward ani­
mals and the rest of nature. "1 In an 
earlip.r essay Rawls is less qualified in 
excluding animals from the protection 
afforded by principles of justice. In 
"The Sense of Justice" he maintains 
that it is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of falling under principles of 
justice that one be a person or that 
one "be capable, to a certain minimum 
degree, of a sense of justice. "2 If 
having this capacity is a necessary 
condition of being owed the duty of 
justice, and given the plain fact that 
animals fail to satisfy it, then animals 
are not owed the duty of justice. 
That is the teaching of the Rawls of 
"The Sense of Justice." In A Theory 
of Justice, however, Rawls states that 
he has "not maintained that the capac­
ity for a sense of justice is necessary 
to be owed duties of justice" (p. 
512), which seems to soften his earlier 
position. 3 But Rawls does not go on 
to claim that animals are owed duties 
of justice. Rather, heobserves that 
"it does seem that we are not required 
to give strict justice" to creatu res 
who lack a capacity for a sense of 
justice (I bid., emphasis added). Why 
this only "seems" to be so is not fully 
explained by Rawls, except for the 
fact" that animals are creatures who 
lack a "sense of justice" and/or are 
not "persons," in his sense. 
We have, then, what appear to be 
two positions concerning the relation­
ship between animals and justice. 
The strong position, set forth in "The 
Sense of Justice," is that, since ani­
mals are not persons, they are not 
owed justice. The weak position, set 
forth in A TheorJ:!. of justice, is that, 
because animals are not persons, it 
seems that they are not owed justice. 
Neither position, I believe, is defensi­
ble, not only because both are at 
odds with what seems to me to be a 
superior, non-Rawlsian account of jus­
tice and our duties of justice to ani­
mals (a yery long story) but because 
neither is consistent with Rawls' own 
views about natu ral duties (a shorter 
one: the topic of this essay). This 
will become clearer once we have 
explored his views about such duties. 
After having noted, in A Theory' of 
Justice, that "it does seem that we 
are not required to give strict justice" 
to creatures who are not persons, 
Rawls goes on to state the following. 
(I)t does not follow that there 
are no requirements at all in 
regard to them (i. e., ani­
mals) .... Certainly it is wrong to 
be cruel to animals and the 
destruction of whole species can 
be a great evil. (p. 512) 
Thus, though animals are not per­
sons, and so are not owed, or at least 
it "seems" that they are not owed, 
strict justice, we do have duties in 
their case, in particular the duty not 
to be cruel to them. If we assume, 
for the present, that this latter duty 
is a duty we have directly to animals 
rather than, as Kant for example 
maintains, that this and other duties 
regarding animals are "indirect duties 
towards humanity, "4 then Rawls' posi­
tion comes to this: We have some 
direct duties to animals, despite the 
fact that they are not persons, but 
we do not have a duty of justice to 
them, or at least it "seems" that we 
do not. 
This difference between those to 
whom we owe the duty of justice, on 
the one hand, and those to whom we 
owe the duty not to be cruel, on the 
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says about these duties elsewhere in 
~ T heo r:y' of ~J:I._sj:ice . Insect ion 19 of 
that work (" Principles for Individuals: 
The Natu ral Duties") Rawls offers two 
characteristics of what he calls natural 
duties. Fi rst, "they apply to us 
without regard to our voluntary acts" 
(p. 114), and second "they hold 
between persons irrespective of their 
institutional arrangements," 
"obtain(ing) between all as equal 
moral persons" (p. 115). The first 
characteristic distinguishes natural 
duties from those duties, such as the 
duty to keep a promise, which arise 
as a result of the performance of a 
voluntary act; the second distin­
gu ishes natu ral duties from those 
which we have as a result of our 
occupying a given place in an institu­
tional arrangement (e. g., the duty of 
an employee to an employer). 
Rawls lists examples of natu ral 
duties. Of particu lar importance for 
present purposes is the fact that the 
list includes both "the natural duty 
not to be crueT'(p.114) and the duty 
of justice" (p. 115). The dilemma 
Rawls must face should already be 
apparent. Natural duties, he says, 
hold between persons -- "between all 
as equal moral persons." But animals 
are not persons, which is why we are 
not required, or at least "it does seem 
that we are not required, II "to give 
strict justice" to them. If, however, 
both the duty not to be cruel and the 
duty of justice are natural duties; if 
natural duties hold equally between all 
persons; and if the fact that animals 
are not persons casts doubt upon or 
undermines ou r having the natu ral 
duty of justice to them; then the fact 
that animals are not persons should 
also cast doubt upon or undermine our 
having the natural duty not to be 
cruel to animals. On the other hand, 
if the fact that animals are not per­
sons does not by itself show or raise 
the suspicion that we do not have the 
natural duty against being cruel to 
animals, then this same fact cannot by 
itself show or raise the suspicion that 
we do not have the natural duty of 
justice to them. Yet Rawls denies 
that we have the duty of justice to 
them (the strong position) or (the 
weak position) affirms that it at least 
"seems" that we do not. The dilemma 
that Rawls must face, then, is that he 
simply cannot have it both ways. 
Either being a person is a decisive 
consideration for determining those to 
whom we have or "seem" to have nat­
ural duties, in which case he cannot 
believe that we have a natu ral duty 
directly to animals not to be cruel to 
them, or being a person is not a deci­
sive consideration, in which case he 
cannot advocate either his strong or 
his weak position regarding animals 
and the duty of justice. Whichever 
alternative Rawls should choose, it 
must be one or the other, not both. 
Th ree replies which seek to defuse 
this dilemma are worth considering. 
I. It might be objected that the 
duty of justice can only obtain 
between individuals who can have this 
duty to each other and that this is a 
relevant difference between this duty 
and the duty not to be cruel. In the 
case of this latter duty, this objection 
holds, we have it to animals despite 
the fact that they do not have it (or 
any other duty) to us. In the case 
of the duty of justice, however, we 
do not have it to an imals because they 
cannot have this duty to us. 
This reply goes no way toward 
defending a disanalogous understand­
ing of the two natural duties in ques­
tion. What one wants is an explana­
tion of why the fact that animals 
cannot owe the duty of justice rules 
out their being being owed this duty 
(or at least "seems" to) if the fact 
that they cannot owe the duty not to 
be cruel does not rule out (or "seem" 
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duty. The objection just sketched 
fails to provide such an explanation, 
and it is difficult to imagine what 
such an explanation might look like. 
What might appear to be the two most 
promising kinds of explanation are not 
available to Rawls, given his analysis 
of natu ral duties. We cannot say that 
we have no duty of justice to an imals 
because they stand outside certain 
actual political or other types of 
arrangements; natural duties do not 
depend for their binding force on 
such arrangements. Nor can we say 
that we have no duty of justice to 
animals because we have not our­
selves, as actual persons in in the 
actual world, entered into any 
"agreement" with them; natural duties 
do not depend for thei r existence on 
the performance or non -performance of 
any voluntary act on the part of any­
one in the actual world. This much 
granted, it should be clear that no 
appeal to our acts or our institutions 
can provide g rounds for disenfranchis­
ing animals, when it comes to the nat­
ural duty of justice or to any other 
natural duty. 
II. The second reply ignores the 
contingencies of the actual world and 
refers instead to the hypothetical sit­
uation of the "original position. " 
Animals are owed the duty against 
being cruel, but not the duty of jus­
tice, according to this second reply, 
because this is the judgment that 
would be reached by those in the 
original position. After all, since the 
origi nal contractors are self-i nterested 
persons who know they will be human 
beings, when they are "incarnated" in 
the actual world, if we might put mat­
ters in these terms, they will view the 
duty of justice in a way that is calcu­
lated to forward their self interest as 
the human beings they know they will 
become. Thus, to exclude animals for 
those to whom the duty of justice is 
owed can ha rdly be contra ry to the 
self interest of the original 
contractors. 
This objection merits two replies 
((A) and (8) below), the first of 
which engenders two critical replies of 
its own ((1) and (2) below). (A) To 
allow that the original contractors 
know that they will become human 
beings, when they are "incarnated," 
is to prejudice the question of who is 
owed the duty of justice in favor of 
human beings and against animals from 
the outset. This prejudicial backdrop 
of the original position not on Iy 
offends against the requirement that 
we be impartial in our assessment of 
relevant interests; what is more, to 
allow the original contractors to know 
that they will be human beings but 
not animals runs counter to what the 
"veil of ignorance" is supposed to 
accomplish. That veil cannot be thick 
enough if, while denying those in the 
original position knowledge about, for 
example, what race or sex they will 
be, when they come to be in the 
actual world, it nevertheless allows 
them to know the species to which 
they wi II belong. 5 
(1) Perhaps it will be objected 
that the supposition that any person 
in the original position could become a 
non-human animal would render the 
very point of the original position 
incoherent. Since persons in that 
position are being asked to choose 
basic principles of justice, principles 
which, among other things, are to lay 
the foundation of social and political 
institutions which will govern the dis­
tribution of ha rms and benefits to 
those who can meaningfully be said to 
be beneficiaries in their own right, 
animals can be excluded from consid­
eration. Whatever else we might want 
to say about animals, it might be 
claimed, they cannot have "a good 
life" and thus cannot be beneficiaries 
in the relevant sense. To deny that 
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Now, this response has a point, up 
to a point. It is doubtful at best that 
we can reasonably view , say, grass­
hoppers or fleas as themselves either 
having or not having a life which 
fares well or ill ·for them considered 
as individuals. However, the situa­
tion with respect to other animals -­
let us call them "higher animals"-- is 
importantly different. The case can 
be made, I believe, for regarding 
mammalian animals in particular as 
being conscious and sentient; as hav­
ing desires or preferences which they 
may either satisfy or have frustrated; 
as having various higher order cogni­
tive capacities, including memory and 
the ability to form beliefs, including 
beliefs which relate to their own 
future; as agents in the world, in the 
sense that they can act intentionally 
or pu rposively, on the basis of thei r 
beliefs, to bring about the satisfaction 
of their desires or preferences; and 
as individuals who have a psycho­
physical identity over time. 6 In the 
case of these animals, therefore, it 
makes perfectly good sense to view 
them as having an individual welfare 
-- as faring well or ill during the 
course of their experiential life, logic­
ally independently of whether anyone 
else happens to value what happens to 
them. Mammalian animals (and possi­
bly others, including birds, though 
where one draws the line in this 
regard is admittedly difficult and con­
troversial) th us can have a good life, 
relative to their nature, and thus can 
be beneficiaries in the relevant sense, 
even if it is true that because of thei r 
limited intellectual capacities they 
themselves are unable to form a con­
ception of thei r welfa re, have a sense 
of justice, or adopt a rational life 
plan . Accordingly, assuming that the 
principles of justice to be selected by 
those in the original position concern, 
among other things, the distribution 
of those harms and benefits which are 
essential to an individual's having a 
good life, the selection would exclude 
only some animals from being owed 
duties of justice. Higher animals (and 
these are the animals I have in mind 
henceforth) would, or at least should, 
be covered by the principles which 
are chosen. The charge of arbitrari­
ness has not been met. 
(2) It might be objected that it is 
not justice but metaphysics that 
excludes even higher animals from 
being owed duties of justice. To 
suppose that a person in the originai 
position could be "incarnated" as a 
higher animal, it might be claimed, is 
to violate standard metaphysical views 
about identity. Metaphysically, a dog 
or a ch impanzee just can't be the same 
individual who once occupied a place 
in the original position. It is not 
arbitrary to exclude animals from 
being owed duties of justice, there­
fore, since even the original contrac­
tors may be permitted to know meta­
physical truths, including the truth 
that, whatever else might transpi re in 
the actual world when they are 
"incarnated." they simply can't trlrn 
out to be a (non-human) animal. 
Problems of identity are admittedly 
serious problems, but their serious­
ness cuts both ways in the present 
case. If it is true, as Rawls allows, 
that any given person in the original 
position might turn out to be a human 
idiot or worse when he comes to be in 
the actual world, and still be the same 
individual he was in the original posi­
tion, then the possession of the cen­
tral characteristic definitive of moral 
personality (a sense of justice) cannot 
be a criterion of personal identity. 
That being so, what ! .eriori reason 
can there be against a person in the 
original position being "incarnated" as 
a dog or chimpanzee? It would be a 
palpable double standard to affirm 
that a human idiot can be the same 
individual as one of the persons in 





















that, as an idiot, he lacks a sense of 
justice, but to deny that a dog or 
chimpanzee can be the same individual 
as one of the persons in the original 
position because, given their cognitive 
and mor'al poverty, these animals lack 
a sense of justice. Moreover, to 
attempt to avoid this dislay of arbi­
trariness by supposing that persons 
in the original position "just know" 
that they will be human beings, how­
ever handicapped, begs the question 
rather than answering it. For the 
question at issue is how animals can 
be non-arbitrarily excluded from those 
who are owed duties of justice. To 
attempt to avoid the point of this 
question by assuming that the original 
contractors "just know" what species 
they will belong to, when they are 
"incarnated," is to repeat the problem 
rather than to resolve it. Thus, nei­
ther of the anticipated objections ((1) 
and (2) above) to the charge that the 
"veil of ignorance" arbitrarily allows 
those in the original position to know 
what species they wi II belong to suc­
ceeds in nullifying this charge. 
(B) A further difficulty inherent 
in appeals to the original position in 
the present case also merits mention­
ing . If, following Rawls, we assume 
that those in the original position 
know that they will be human beings, 
when they are "incarnated" in the 
actual world, we need to ask what 
possible basis the original contractors 
can have for agreeing that there is a 
natural duty not to be cruel which is 
owed directly to animals. The duties 
these contractors will recognize must 
be contingent upon what duties are in 
thei r self interest to recognize. But 
if, ex hypothesi, those in the original 
position will never become animals, 
and know this, then they cannot pos­
sibly have any self-interested reason 
to recognize a direct duty not to be 
cruel to animals -- a duty, that is, 
owed directly to animals independently 
of human interests. Thus, if the 
duty not to be cruel IS a natu ral 
duty, which is what Rawls says it is, 
and if we have this duty directly to 
animals, which is what he evidently 
believes, then the grounds for our 
having this duty directly to animals 
are not to be found by asking about 
the supposed "outcome of a hypotheti­
cal agreement" (p. 115) struck 
between the self-interested persons in 
the original position, as Rawls under­
stands this. A contract wh ich 
includes direct duties to animals, 
.ncluding the direct duty not to be 
cruel to them, cannot be forthcoming 
if the only basis for selecting duties 
is the yardstick of human interest. 
In view of the two objections ((A) 
and (B) above) raised against the 
second reply, therefore, Rawls cannot 
be spared the pain of the dilemma 
urged against him by having recourse 
to what does or does not transpire in 
the origi nal position. 
III. A third attempt to defuse this 
dilemma is to credit Rawls with the 
view that we have no di rect duties to 
animals, something we have been 
assuming he would accept from the 
outset. But the view that we have no 
direct duties to animals is not only 
implausible in its own right, for rea­
sons I have adduced on other occa­
sions and shall not repeat here; 7 more 
importantly for present purposes, it is 
also at odds with the general tenor of 
what Rawls himself says about ou r 
duties regarding animals. For Rawls 
explicitly states that "(t) he capacity 
for feelings of pleasure and pain and 
for the forms of life of which animals 
are capable clearly impose some duties 
on us, including the duty not to be 
cruel to them (p. 512). But if it is 
these facts about animals themselves 
which 1m-pose certain duties on us, 
then these duties must be grounded in 
these facts, and not based on specula­
tions, asin Kant's view, about how 
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will lead us to treat human beings, 
the good or ill effects of this latter 
treatment for human beings constitut­
ing the supposed gr'ounds of our 
duties regarding animals. All the 
available evidence supports reading 
Rawls as agreeing that some of our 
duties regarding animals, including 
particular our duty not to be cruel to 
them, are duties we have directly to 
animals themselves. 
The dilemma posed above thus 
seerdS recalcitrant to attempts to 
amputate or dull its horns, and 
though there may be other attempted 
defenses which have not been consid­
ered here it seems fai r, in view of the 
fa ilure of the defen ses wh ich have 
been considered, to force the dilemma 
home and require Rawls to choose 
between the two alternatives: Either 
being a person is a decisive consider­
ation for determining those to whom 
natu ral duties are owed (or those to 
whom natural duties "seem" . to be 
owed) or it is not. It cannot be 
both. Reasons-have been advanced in 
the above which support Rawls' selec­
tion of the latter alternative, since it 
is only by selecting it and then going 
on to abandon both his strong and his 
weak positions regarding justice and 
animals that his views about how we 
are to determine those to whom we 
owe the natu ral duty of justice can be 
reconciled with his views about how 
we are to determine those to whom we 
owe the natu ral duty not to be cruel. 
Were Rawls to recognize the merits of 
selecting the latter alternative, the 
way would then be cleared for him to 
explore a theory of justice that did 
not "include ~ our relations with 
those humans who are persons in the 
actual world but also took into account 
our natural duty of justice as this 
relates to "how we are to conduct 
ourselves toward animals." What 
shape that theory would take cannot 
be determined in advance. All that is 
certain is that it would be a quite 
different theory, all considered, than 
the one Rawls has set forth to date. 8 
Tom Regan� 
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